Reporter 9/12/98: The authority of the officers to conduct legal proceedings: Notice

The authority of the officers to conduct legal proceedings: Notice

7 December 1998

The Council have considered the remarks made at the Discussion, held on 17 November 1998, of the following topic of concern to the University: the ruling, made by the Vice-Chancellor's deputy appointed to consider a recent representation under Statute K, 5, which relates to the authority of the officers to conduct legal proceedings (Reporter, p. 190).

The Council wish to clarify their position on a number of matters of general principle. They do not believe that it would be helpful to comment on questions on which individuals are currently in dispute with the University, except insofar as this is necessary to illustrate a general point.

1. Dr Edwards argued that the regulation governing the Council's legal powers (Statutes and Ordinances, 1998, p. 120) should be construed as meaning that no body other than the Council is empowered to undertake legal proceedings on behalf of the University (except, of course, bodies which are explicitly so empowered by Statute or Ordinance). The Council agree with Dr Edwards that the circumstances of the enactment of this regulation in 1968 clearly indicate that this was the intention behind it. However, this has no bearing on the propriety of delegation by the Council to its officers. The Vice-Chancellor's deputy indicated in his ruling that it has been settled practice for many years for the principal officers to undertake legal proceedings, acting as delegates of the Council, and that there is no impropriety in such delegation.

2. While it would be open to them to do so, the Council do not propose to withdraw the authority exercised by their principal officers in this way. They agree with the point made by Professor Mellor that the good order and management of the University depend on such arrangements and would be prejudiced if the officers' ability to act in individual cases, particularly those involving matters which are personally sensitive for individuals, required the specific authority of the Council.

3. The Council wish to make clear that officers on the staff of the Old Schools have customarily reported to the Council any significant legal matter affecting the University. That they have not advised the Council of every legal matter reflects the enormous range of legal advice and action in which an organization as large and complex as the University inevitably finds itself involved. However, to ensure that the officers have a proper framework within which to act, the Council approved new procedures during 1997-98 under which responsibility for these matters is exercised through the Registrary, reporting to the Executive Committee, which is a statutory committee of the Council (Statute A, V).

4. Statute K, 5 provides for a representation to be made to the Vice-Chancellor by anyone who believes that there has been a contravention of the Statutes or Ordinances. On this occasion the Vice-Chancellor, as he was entitled to do, referred the representation from Dr Griffin to a deputy, who inquired into the matter and declared that there had been no contravention. The deputy was acting for the Vice-Chancellor, and in reaching this conclusion he was therefore taking a decision on a question which had been remitted to him; he was not reporting to the Vice-Chancellor on a matter on which the Vice-Chancellor was to take action. The Council do not accept Professor Dumville's interpretation of the deputy's status in acting for the Vice-Chancellor; they wish to clarify their position on this important issue.

5. Statute K, 5 further provides that: 'if they are dissatisfied with [the Vice-Chancellor's] decision, any fifty members of the Regent House may within one week appeal in writing to the Chancellor, whose decision shall be final. If there is no such appeal, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor shall be final.' No appeal was made against the decision of the Vice-Chancellor's deputy either in respect of the matter raised by Dr Griffin or in respect of that raised earlier by Dr Evans. Accordingly, the decision is final. Nevertheless, the Council reiterate that they have introduced, through the Registrary, arrangements to ensure that they are properly informed about such matters.

6. The finding of the Vice-Chancellor's deputy that it is 'reasonable and generally recognized usage of the University for contracts of employment in respect of General Board institutions to be made by, and where necessary terminated by, the Secretary General' has been taken out of context in the remarks made by Dr Evans and Professor Dumville. It is clear that the Vice-Chancellor's deputy was dealing with a specific allegation. In that context he found that it was a necessary incident of the making or termination of contracts for the principal officers to defend legal proceedings, to make final offers of settlement, and to agree terms as well as to incur reasonable expenses. It was not said in the ruling, as alleged by Dr Evans, that 'the Registrary and the Secretary General and other Administrative Officers really can hire and fire at their own discretion'. Although they have the power to make and terminate contracts, their discretion has to be exercised in accordance with the Statutes and Ordinances of the University, including Statute U, and with the terms of individual contracts of employment and the recognized usages and practices of the University.

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